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Abstract: This paper examines 
Canadian counter-battery work during 
Operation Switchback, the battle 
to clear the Breskens Pocket, from 
6 October to 3 November 1944 
during the Battle of the Scheldt. The 
Canadians achieved some success 
at isolating hostile batteries in the 
pocket, but predicted shooting was 
too inaccurate to permanently silence 
them. In the planning stage, the 
Canadians had little knowledge of the 
Germans’ strength and dispositions 
behind their defences north of the 
Leopold Canal. Throughout the 
battle, those involved in locating 
hostile batteries strove to overcome 
challenges posed by the weather 
and terrain. Operational research 
conducted after the battle revealed 
that predicted fire dispersed shells 
over an excessively large area, mostly 
because of human error. Ultimately, 
the evidence challenges the idea 
that the Allies won the Second World 
War by the “brute force” use of their 
superior artillery and air assets rather 
than through skill and ingenuity.
On 4 September 1944 British troops, with the help of the 
Belgian resistance, captured the port 
of Antwerp intact. It was one of the 
largest and most important ports 
in Western Europe, but it lay at the 
end of the Scheldt Estuary whose 
50-kilometre length was controlled 
by the Germans. It was essential that 
the port be opened to shipping as 
quickly as possible since the Allies 
were facing a logistical crisis. Most 
supplies still came over the original 
D-Day beaches and had to be trucked 
to the front, a distance of nearly 500 
kilometres. The use of a large port 
was critical to the success of future 
operations.
From 13 September,  while 
the British prepared for a narrow 
armoured and airborne thrust 
through the Netherlands (Operation 
Market Garden), First Canadian 
Army’s task was to clear the Scheldt 
Estuary. Operation Switchback was 
the battle to capture the “Breskens 
Pocket,” a virtual island bordered by 
the Scheldt River, the Leopold Canal, 
the Braakman Inlet, and the North 
Sea. About 33 kilometres east to west 
and 18 kilometres north to south, the 
pocket was mostly below sea level. 
The terrain was not conducive to 
mobile warfare. The only high ground 
was found southeast of Knocke, as 
well as some sand dunes on the south 
shore of the Scheldt. Worse, a German 
flooding programme presented 
serious obstacles. In addition to an 
inundated section in the west, a wide 
flooded band in the south ran almost 
to the Braakman, leaving only an 
eight-kilometre stretch of traversable 
land along the Leopold. The flooded 
areas were under anywhere from 
several inches to four or five feet 
of water. The soil had turned to 
mud, making the area impassable to 
vehicles.1
Histories of the battle have 
usually offered a brief chronology of 
events without providing much detail 
into the Canadians’ preparations or 
the battle’s aftermath. For decades, 
the definitive account of Canadian 
operations in Northwest Europe 
has been C.P. Stacey’s official army 
history The Victory Campaign. In his 
treatment of the Scheldt battle, Stacey 
emphasized strategic issues, and, in 
particular, criticized Montgomery’s 
failure to give the opening of Antwerp 
sufficient attention.2 Subsequent 
studies of the Battle of the Scheldt 
tended to focus on Operation 
Infatuate, the capture of Walcheren 
Island on the north shore of the 
Scheldt Estuary. In the three decades 
following the war, the historiography 
of the clearing of the Breskens Pocket 
hardly went beyond Stacey’s official 
history.3
Stacey credited the Canadians’ 
victory, at least in part, to their 
generous artillery support and 
the infantry’s ability to call in 
concentrations of fire quickly and 
readily.4 This view is consistent 
with John Ellis’ observation in his 
book Brute Force that the Allies had 
an overwhelming advantage over 
Germany and Japan in economic 
capacity, which translated into 
numerical superiority in artillery, 
armour, aircraft and ships. Yet 
according to Ellis, instead of using 
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This air photo was taken on 6 October 1944, the first day of the 7th Canadian Infantry Brigade 
attack across the Leopold Canal. It shows the sector assaulted by the Royal Montreal Regiment 
and the Regina Rifles. The effects of Canadian defensive artillery fire is evident, especially in Eede. 
The flooded ground north of the canal which affected movement is also visible.  Laurier Centre for 
Military Strategic and Disarmament Studies Air Photo Collection 196/3047 & 3049
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these assets to achieve a quick and 
decisive victory, commanders of 
the Western Allies, anxious to avoid 
heavy loss of life, “seemed unable to 
impose their will upon the enemy 
except by slowly and persistently 
battering him to death with a blunt 
instrument.”5 This “brute force” thesis 
was largely based on generalizations 
and oversimplifications, not a 
detailed analysis of operational 
documents. Stacey’s contention that 
the Canadians owed their victory at 
the Scheldt to the infantry’s ability 
to request immediate artillery fire on 
prearranged targets was not seriously 
contested until the appearance of Terry 
Copp’s Montgomery’s Scientists. This 
edited collection, which reproduced a 
series of operational research reports 
written during the war, showed that 
Canadian shells were dispersed over 
large areas, which indicated that 
predicted artillery fire was not nearly 
as accurate as previously thought.6
This  ar t i c le  examines  the 
appl icat ion of  predic ted f i re 
techniques – counter-battery (CB) 
work – during Operation Switchback. 
It builds on Copp’s books and 
challenges Ellis’ thesis in Brute Force. 
The clearing of the Breskens Pocket 
was not a return to the voluminous 
barrages of the First World War. 
Switchback was an example of the 
Allies’ use of artillery in a precise and 
economical fashion. The artillery plan 
for the operation was not designed 
to blanket the enemy with fire, but 
to engage specific targets when 
needed. The Allies’ employment 
of sophisticated CB techniques, 
and the creation of an efficient 
communications system necessary 
for these techniques, suggests 
that artillery in Switchback was 
anything but a “blunt instrument.” 
The methods used to identify and 
locate hostile batteries were effective, 
as long as atmospheric conditions 
and the terrain cooperated. That was 
very rarely the case during the battle. 
While the Canadians were mostly 
successful in identifying and locating 
hostile batteries in the Breskens 
Pocket, predicted fire was seldom 
accurate enough to permanently 
destroy them. Nevertheless, the 
fire was close enough that it often 
suppressed the enemy batteries 
during crucial periods in the battle.
The Plan for 
Operation Switchback
The plan for Operation Switchback m a d e  C B  w o r k  d i f f i c u l t . 
While the plan was ambitious, 
imaginative and allowed for large-
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scale artillery support, intelligence 
greatly underestimated the German 
strength in the Breskens Pocket, 
and the terrain offered little hope 
of gathering further intelligence 
through observation. Because the plan 
demanded surprise, it eliminated any 
preliminary counter-bombardment. 
With limited knowledge of the 
German gun positions, the Canadian 
counter-battery staff and associated 
units faced a challenging task. 
D i r e c t i n g  t h e  b a t t l e  w a s 
Lieutenant-General G.G. Simonds, 
who was temporarily in command 
of First Canadian Army while 
Lieutenant-General H.D.G. Crerar 
was  in  the  Uni ted  Kingdom 
undergoing medical treatment. 
In the meantime, Major-General 
Charles Foulkes took Simonds’ place 
commanding II Canadian Corps. On 
2 October Foulkes filed his outline 
for Operation Switchback, which was 
largely based on an earlier version 
devised by Simonds.7 The objective 
was twofold: to capture the Breskens 
Pocket and clear the German coast 
artillery dominating the Scheldt, 
and to provide suitable areas for 
Allied artillery positions to support 
follow-on operations against the 
strongly-held Walcheren Island. The 
task of clearing the pocket fell to 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Division under 
Major-General D.C. Spry.
The innovative operation used 
two spearheads to take advantage 
of German weaknesses. First, on 6 
October, Brigadier J.G. Spragge’s 7th 
Canadian Infantry Brigade would 
attack a dry section of the German 
defensive line north of Leopold Canal 
where it diverged from the Canal de 
Dérivation de la Lys. The 7th Brigade 
would be followed later by Brigadier 
K.G. Blackader’s 8th Canadian 
Infantry Brigade. The second phase 
of the plan called for Brigadier J.M. 
Rockingham’s 9th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade to cross the Braakman in 
amphibious Landing Vehicles, 
Tracked (LVTs, or “Buffaloes”), and 
land in a relatively undefended area 
near Hoofdplaat on 8 October. This 
would force the Germans to fight on 
two fronts and cut their escape routes 
at Breskens and Hoofdplaat. Once 
the two bridgeheads were linked, the 
Canadians would advance westward 
to the coastal town of Knocke to clear 
the rest of the pocket.8
For a one-division operation, 
the plan for Operation Switchback 
provided very generous artillery 
support. The artillery formations 
allotted to the operation included 
2nd Canadian Army Group, Royal 
Artillery (AGRA) (two heavy and 
four medium regiments) on the left 
and 9th British AGRA (one super 
heavy, two heavy, and four medium 
regiments) on the right, plus the field 
artillery from 3rd and 4th Canadian 
Divisions. Throughout the operation, 
the medium regiments, totalling 128 
guns, would conduct most of the 
CB fire while the field regiments 
would provide direct support of the 
attacking infantry.9
The element of surprise was 
critical for the success of Operation 
Switchback. Simonds’ plan called for 
a “silent” policy for the days before the 
attack; there was to be no preliminary 
CB fire or even any registration 
shoots.10 The only bombardment 
allowed prior to the attack was from 
4th Division’s field guns, which 
were to continue harassing fire to 
the east of 7th Brigade’s crossing 
point as a diversion until H-Hour, 
set for 0530 hours on 6 October. A 
one-hour bombardment was to begin 
at H minus 120 minutes. From H 
minus 55 to H minus 25 minutes, a 
short CB programme would engage 
fixed batteries. Finally, another 
bombardment programme would 
run until H plus 150 minutes, after 
which the infantry would call in 
fire as needed. At H-Hour, the CB 
policy would be “active” – as soon 
as a hostile battery opened fire, it was 
to be engaged immediately. For the 
whole day, the counter-battery officer 
(CBO) had priority call on all heavy 
guns and two medium regiments. 
Twenty rounds per field gun, 50 per 
medium gun, and 50 per heavy gun 
were allocated to CB tasks.11
Because there would be no 
preliminary bombardment aside 
from the timed programme, it was 
imperative to use observation to 
locate enemy artillery, mortars and 
machine guns. The 4th Division was 
Formation
Field Guns Medium Guns Heavy Guns Super Heavy Guns
Total
25-pdr 4.5-inch 5.5-inch 7.2-inch 155mm 8-inch 240 mm
3 Cdn Inf Div 72 72
4 Cdn Armd Div 72 72
2 Cdn AGRA 16 48 16 8 88
9 AGRA 64 16 12 1 2 95
Total 144 16 112 32 20 1 2 327
Anglo-Canadian Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback, 6 October 1944
Source: WD, HQ 2 Cdn AGRA, October 1944: app. 1, RCA 2 Cdn Corps Op Instr No. 8, 5 October 1944, p.1.
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tasked with establishing observation 
posts along the whole Leopold front.12 
Nos.660 and 661 Air Observation Post 
(AOP) squadrons, Royal Air Force 
(RAF) were available for observation, 
with individual flights assigned to 
specified zones of responsibility.13
Counter-Battery 
Work in 1944
The 2nd Counter Battery Officer’s Staff was vital in the priority task 
of engaging hostile batteries. The CB 
staff sought to provide information 
about the location, strength, arcs 
of fire and behaviour of the enemy 
artillery and to use that information 
to silence, or at least suppress, hostile 
batteries.14 Some of the techniques to 
emerge from the First World War for 
locating hostile batteries continued to 
be used during the Second, including 
flash spotting, air observation, sound 
ranging, espionage, and intelligence 
from locals and prisoners.15
The  Br i t i sh  had  ad jus ted 
artillery organization and field 
communications early in the Second 
World War to apply scientific methods 
in identifying and locating enemy 
batteries. The CBO was attached to 
corps headquarters and responsible to 
the commander, corps Royal Artillery 
(CCRA). His role was to compile and 
disseminate intelligence summaries 
of hostile batteries to divisional 
headquarters and artillery units. The 
CBO was not a commander, but an 
adviser to the CCRA on CB policy 
and communications requirements.16 
During Switchback, the CBO of II 
Canadian Corps was Lieutenant-
Colonel J.H.D. Ross. He had his 
own staff of about 30 men, including 
staff officers and their clerks, and 
a number of batmen, drivers and 
orderlies.17 Acting CBOs (ACBOs), 
usually captains, were assigned to 
each division and were responsible 
for the technical work, such as 
analyzing shell craters and shell 
fragments, examining photographs, 
o r d e r i n g  b o m b a r d m e n t s  f o r 
divisional frontages, and contributing 
material for intelligence summaries 
and hostile battery lists. A special 
ACBO (Air) was responsible for 
liaison with the Army Photographic 
Interpretation Section and assisted 
the Air Liaison Officer in briefing 
pilots for artillery reconnaissance.18 
CB intelligence summaries contained 
a review of CB operations and newly 
identified hostile batteries. These 
were normally filed and distributed 
at least weekly,19 but Ross and his 
staff did so almost daily during active 
operations. These summaries are 
essential for understanding CB work 
during the Battle of the Scheldt.
The bulk of CB intelligence came 
from the corps’ survey regiment, in 
this case 2nd Survey Regiment, RCA. 
It consisted of two batteries, each 
composed of an observation troop for 
flash spotting, a sound ranging troop, 
and a survey troop. This structure 
was well-suited to work under corps 
or to be assigned temporarily to 
divisions.20 
The British and Canadians 
entrusted much of their CB work 
to sound ranging. The purpose of 
sound ranging was to locate hostile 
batteries where visual methods could 
not by tracing the sound made by 
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A 5.5-inch gun of the Royal Canadian Artillery in action south of Vaucelles, France, 23 July 1944. This 
medium gun was the standard artillery piece used for counter-battery fire during Operation Switchback.
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a firing gun or an exploding shell. 
The technique took advantage of 
the relatively slow speed of sound, 
1107.6 feet per second in still air at 
50 degrees Fahrenheit and 50 percent 
relative humidity. Recorders could 
measure to within 1/300 of a second, 
during which sound travels just over 
a metre.21 The principle on which 
sound ranging rested assumed that if 
sound travels at the same velocity in 
all directions, it will travel at the same 
speed between its source and any two 
points that are equidistant from it 
(i.e. if the source is actually midway 
between the two points). But if the 
source – the firing gun – happened to 
be closer to one point, then the sound 
would reach it sooner than the other 
point. Thus, using microphones at a 
set distance apart, surveyors could 
determine the location of the enemy 
gun by calculating the discrepancy 
between the times at which the 
same sound reached two different 
points. In 1944, surveyors used five 
or six microphones spaced 1,000 
or 2,000 metres apart in a straight 
line or a concave curve in front of 
enemy territory to create the sound 
ranging base.22 This technique was 
the most common method used in 
the Breskens Pocket to identify active 
German batteries.
Of course, sound ranging was 
never straightforward because 
atmospheric conditions greatly affect 
the transmission of sound waves. 
While humidity has little influence on 
sound, temperature does: for every 
degree Fahrenheit above 50, sound 
travels one foot per second faster, 
and the opposite for every degree 
below 50. More importantly, wind 
has a significant effect on the speed 
of sound, as sound waves travel faster 
downwind of the source. Moreover, 
when the wind travels faster along 
the ground than it does higher in the 
atmosphere, it tends to direct sound 
upwards, making sound increasingly 
inaudible on the ground as it travels 
away from its source.23 Terrain is also 
important as audibility can be poor 
in valleys. Heavy bombardments 
made it difficult to isolate discharges 
from particular batteries.24 In ideal 
conditions, the probable error in 
locating a hostile battery at a range 
of 1,000 yards by sound ranging 
alone was at least 100 yards with 1944 
methods.25 
Nevertheless, sound ranging 
had several advantages over other 
CB techniques. It was quick and 
could provide more information on 
the type of hostile battery than any 
other survey method. It required 
only a single shot to identify and 
locate a hostile battery, and it had 
a particular advantage over visual 
methods such as flash spotting 
whose effectiveness was limited by 
modern flashless propellants and 
concealment measures.26
The lack of natural observation 
points produced by the flat terrain of 
western Belgium and the Netherlands 
certainly favoured the defence 
and made CB work for Switchback 
challenging. Until a tall structure 
could be captured, the Canadians 
A 5.5-inch gun firing in support of the Canadians.
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had no “vantage points from which 
artillery officers could observe and 
direct the fire of the guns.”27 A 
further problem was that the German 
batteries had been rather inactive in 
late September when 4th Division had 
held the area south of the Leopold 
Canal, and few hostile batteries had 
been identified and located before 
3rd Division’s arrival.28 By 5 October, 
2nd Survey Regiment managed to 
establish two sound ranging and two 
flash spotting observation posts, the 
latter upon towers built by engineers. 
This preliminary CB work achieved 
some immediate results: on 5 October 
alone, the Canadians identified 29 
active hostile batteries. All but three, 
however, were “unfixed,” which 
meant that their positions were not 
known with sufficient accuracy 
to warrant bombardment without 
further investigation.29 The CB staff 
and the survey regiment would have 
to work quickly to fix the rest of the 
German batteries as soon as possible 
during the early days of the battle.
German Dispositions 
in the Breskens Pocket
Although the Canadians had a clear idea of the German 
defences and the nature of the terrain 
immediately across the Leopold 
Canal, the plan for Switchback 
suffered from insufficient knowledge 
of enemy strength and dispositions in 
the pocket. In September, intelligence 
predicted and then confirmed that 
the Germans might take advantage 
of the Canadians’ inability to use 
tanks in the area by holding the south 
bank of the West Scheldt for as long 
as possible. They had no intention 
of falling back from the Leopold, 
determined to keep their own guns 
on the south bank of the West Scheldt 
to hold the approaches to Antwerp.30
By about 20 September 1944, 
100,000 men of the German Fifteenth 
Army and thousands of vehicles and 
artillery pieces had been evacuated 
across the West Scheldt, leaving 64th 
Infantry Division and some attached 
units to defend “Scheldt Fortress 
South.”31 While Allied intelligence 
of 64th Division’s forward positions 
was very good, there was no reliable 
information on its reserves or its 
total strength in men or equipment. 
According to Copp, Ultra (intelligence 
derived from decrypted German 
signals) “provided little assistance 
when it came to questions of enemy 
strengths and dispositions, so much 
depended on photo reconnaissance 
and patrol reports.”32 On 5 October, 
the day before the attack, II Canadian 
Corps’ counter-battery staff had 
catalogued some 68 medium and 
A German pillbox mounting a 105 mm gun in an armoured turret. This position was not destroyed by counter-battery fire and 
remained in action until captured by the Canadian Scottish and North Nova Scotia Highlanders near the end of the battle.
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heavy artillery pieces in the pocket.33 
Very little was known of the Germans’ 
coastal artillery positions, and in any 
case most of the German artillery 
was thought to be in the second line 
of defence just behind the Leopold.34 
The garrison’s strength in men was 
estimated at no higher than 7,000 
men, only 2,000 of which were 
thought to be infantry. “There have 
been no indications that the enemy 
has undisclosed reserves of any 
considerable strength in layback 
positions behind his present line,” 
according to an intelligence summary 
from 7 October.35 The 64th Division 
was comprised of the 1037th, 1038th 
and 1039th Grenadier Regiments. 
In the days preceding the attack, 
intelligence placed 1039th Regiment 
on the enemy’s left flank, 1038th in 
the centre of the line, and 1037th 
furthest to the west. The central and 
eastern sectors of 64th Division’s 
front were believed to be reinforced 
with 500 men of 129th Anti-Aircraft 
Regiment, equipped with 88 mm 
guns.36
The German position in the 
Breskens Pocket was stronger than 
the Allies realized. Generalmajor 
Knut Eberding’s 64th Division 
had been selected to hold Scheldt 
Fortress South because, of all the 
divisions in Fifteenth Army, it was 
the strongest in equipment and 
skilled men, especially compared 
to those divisions that had seen 
action in Normandy. It had a full 
complement of artillery, including 
203rd Naval Coast Artillery Battalion 
and elements of the 204th, as well as 
ample ammunition and supplies.37 
On Walcheren, in positions that 
could fire into the Breskens Pocket, 
was the 810th Naval Anti-Aircraft 
Battalion at Flushing and, elsewhere 
on the island, the 202nd Naval 
Coast Artillery Battalion. Historical 
narratives written during and shortly 
after the war placed the German 
strength in the pocket on 6 October 
1944 as high as 15,000 men.38 From 
German sources, the actual number 
of German troops left in the Breskens 
Pocket was about 11,000 following 
the exodus of most of Fifteenth 
Army across the Scheldt. Excluding 
anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns, the 
garrison had anywhere from 65 to 73 
guns of 75 mm or larger.39 This was a 
substantially stronger force than the 
Canadians estimated.
The Attack
Artillery activity during the battle can be divided into three 
distinct phases. The first, from 6 to 
14 October, saw extremely heavy 
bombardment from both sides while 
the Canadian infantry made little 
progress. During the period from 
15 to 20 October, the slow infantry 
progress continued but the German 
guns were very quiet. This limited the 
CB work that could contribute to the 
Canadian advance. CB intelligence 
gathering, particularly by visual 
techniques, was again compromised 
by poor weather in the last stage 
of the battle, from 21 October to 3 
November.
During the first days of Operation 
Switchback the Canadian infantry 
struggled to establish a bridgehead 
on the north side of the Leopold 
Canal. The fire plan opened at 0330 
hours on 6 October, two hours before 
the infantry assault. The programme 
went according to plan, except 
at about 0420 hours when heavy 
German shells hit the headquarters of 
13th Field Regiment near Zeebrugge, 
“which provided an early reveille 
for many people and turned one 
vehicle into a reasonable replica of a 
sieve.”40 Such occurrences were quite 
rare throughout the operation; the 
Germans never mounted concerted 
CB efforts and preferred instead 
to shell the infantry bridgeheads. 
Canadian artillery units seldom 
Weapon Type Calibre Quantity Total
Mortar
8.1 cm 38
39
12 cm 1
Antiaircraft
20 mm 8
65
Quadruple 20 mm 8
French 25 mm 6
37 mm 15
Twin 37 mm 3
40 mm 2
88 mm 23
Antitank
3.7 cm 9
13
5.7 cm 6
Gun
7.5 cm 31
37Czech 83.5 mm 5
15 cm 1
Howitzer
Czech 80 mm 1
48
10.5 cm 20
15 cm 21
Soviet 
(calibre unknown) 6
Total 202 
German Artillery Assets, Operation Switchback, 
30 September 1944
Source: A.G. Steiger, AHQ Report No.69, 30 July 1954, par. 205 and note.
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reported enemy shells landing in 
their lines. During the short CB 
programme before the attack, the 
Allies engaged 29 fixed batteries at a 
ratio of 14 guns per hostile battery.41
At 0530 hours, the infantry of 
Spragge’s 7th Canadian Infantry 
Brigade attacked across the Leopold 
supported by f lame-throwing 
“Wasp” armoured vehicles. On the 
right, 1st Battalion, Canadian Scottish 
Regiment secured a small bridgehead 
at Oosthoek and Moershoofd, while 
the Regina Rifle Regiment (with 
the Royal  Montreal  Regiment 
replacing its “B” Company on the 
left) struggled to establish a foothold 
across from Moerhuizen.42 Resistance 
was stiff: there were simply more 
troops opposite the canal than 
expected, including substantial 
reserves. A company of 1st Parachute 
Replacement and Training Regiment 
had come from Sluis to reinforce 
1038th Grenadier Regiment’s sector.43 
As the morning progressed, there 
was also much more German shelling 
than expected. The war diarist of 
23rd Field Regiment (Self-Propelled), 
RCA wrote, “apparently the Germans 
have a lot more stuff over there than 
we had thought. He has concealed 
his strength very cleverly.”44 It was 
already becoming apparent that the 
Canadians had underestimated the 
German defences.
L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l  R o s s 
considered the pre-zero hour CB 
programme a success because the 
German guns had remained quiet for 
the early morning. However, he made 
it clear in his intelligence summary 
for 6 October that determining the 
effectiveness of CB fire during an 
operation was almost impossible; 
most of the hostile batteries identified 
had just been holes in the ground 
from which German guns fired. 
Limited visibility meant that the AOP 
squadrons could identify only some 
of the enemy’s gun positions. Hence, 
by the afternoon, German guns were 
able to fire on the attacking infantry 
with impunity. At the very least, 
with so much enemy shelling, the 
CB staff had more information with 
which to locate German batteries: on 
the first day of the operation, twelve 
new batteries were fixed, mostly by 
AOP, and five additional batteries 
were identified by sound ranging.45
The Canadians held onto their 
tenuous bridgeheads in the face of 
continued strong resistance. On 7 
October, most of the enemy shelling 
came from field and medium guns 
located close to the Germans’ forward 
defences at the Leopold. That day the 
CB staff identified 17 hostile batteries 
Shells land in Breskens, 22 October 1944.
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by sound ranging, and another six 
by flash spotting. All batteries that 
had been fixed were engaged as soon 
as they fired, and sometimes the 
Canadians tried to engage an unfixed 
battery “for lack of a better target.” 
The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA and 
3rd Super Heavy Regiment, RA each 
engaged one battery near Cadzand 
to the west and were reportedly 
successful.46 The next day, 8 October, 
saw only light, but continuous, enemy 
shelling. Thus far, artillery support 
seemed to be effective. Headquarters, 
2nd Canadian AGRA commended 
4th Medium Regiment, RCA in a 
message stating that the “Infantry 
is well pleased with Harassing Fire 
– very good. You have shut up the 
Jerries. The Infantry can rest a bit 
now.”47 The message was premature, 
however, as enemy fire intensified 
in the evening. The survey regiment 
identified 13 active German batteries 
on 8 October, the majority by sound 
ranging. Much of the enemy fire 
came from the Cadzand area.48 
That evening, from its position at 
Maldegem, 3rd Medium Regiment 
engaged a battery of four 9-inch guns 
on the south shore of the Scheldt 
from 2030 hours to midnight.49 The 
7th Medium Regiment, RCA also 
engaged and silenced two hostile 
batteries using air observation, but 
was then ordered to proceed north of 
Antwerp the next day to support 2nd 
Canadian Infantry Division.50
The pressure on the 7th Brigade 
bridgeheads was supposed to have 
been eased by 9th Brigade’s assault 
from Terneuzen scheduled to begin 
at 0130 hours on 8 October, but at 
the last minute that attack had to 
be delayed by 24 hours. The 9th 
Brigade troops were transported 
in LVTs, and approached, out of 
sight of the enemy, in the Ghent–
Terneuzen Canal. The vehicles 
could not climb up at the damaged 
locks at Terneuzen, however, and 
engineers had to construct ramps.51 
The men on the Leopold front had 
to withstand the full force of German 
counterattacks for another day. In 
the early hours of 9 October, with no 
preliminary counter-bombardment, 
the North Nova Scotia Highlanders 
landed at Green Beach east of 
Hoofdplaat and the Highland Light 
Infantry of Canada landed at Amber 
Beach immediately to the south. The 
infantry met no German resistance. 
The reserve battalion, the Stormont, 
Dundas and Glengarry Highlanders, 
landed later in the morning. Ross sent 
a detachment along with the brigade 
to coordinate CB work on the new 
front. By 0900 hours, the Canadians 
had created a bridgehead some 
1,500 yards deep pushing westward 
beyond the main dykes. Alarmed, 
the Germans responded with intense 
artillery fire from the heavy guns at 
Breskens and Flushing, “a visitation 
which made movement by our 
vehicles a somewhat precarious 
duty.”52
On the morning of 9 October, 
while Rockingham’s 9th Brigade was 
busy consolidating its bridgehead 
near Hoofdplaat, Ross met with 
Brigadier E.R. Suttie (Commander, 
2nd Canadian AGRA), both of whom 
were headquartered at Eelvelde, 
near Maldegem. Ross needed to 
discuss some problems with counter-
bombardment. Enemy artillery 
activity on the Leopold had increased 
dramatically overnight, and the 
Canadian countermeasures were 
not having much effect. Only 25 
rounds had been allotted to medium 
and heavy guns per day for CB 
tasks, which was only enough to 
engage hostile batteries known 
to be active and not enough to 
destroy them outright or to suppress 
positions that were only suspect. 
Suttie discussed the matter with 
Brigadier A.B. Matthews (CCRA, II 
Canadian Corps), also at Eelvelde, 
and later that morning Ross received 
word that the ammunition allotment 
to CB tasks had been increased to 50 
and 35 rounds for medium and heavy 
guns per day, respectively.53 
Even though the Canadians 
i n c r e a s e d  t h e i r  a m m u n i t i o n 
expenditure, it was becoming clear by 
the 10th that their countermeasures 
were frustratingly ineffective. 
Ross noted that the Canadians had 
achieved at least some success the 
day before as the German forward 
batteries either were temporarily 
silenced or were never heard from 
again.54 But the Germans had 
already begun to bring their reserves 
forward, as three companies of 
1st Parachute Replacement and 
Training Regiment had relieved 
1038th Grenadier Regiment by the 
previous night.55 More German 
batteries were active than ever. 
Furthermore, the coastal batteries, 
including two batteries at Cadzand 
that were causing the most trouble, 
could not be engaged as effectively 
because the 5.5- and 4.5-inch gun-
howitzers had maximum ranges 
of about 15,840 and 19,360 yards, 
respectively. The greater the distance 
from the target, the more diffuse the 
Canadian concentrations became. 
The Canadian weapons were no 
match for the German 150 mm coastal 
guns firing from Walcheren, which 
could hurl shells some 24,000 to 
26,800 yards.56 Thus there was very 
little the Canadians could do about 
the coastal batteries until the front 
line moved forward.
From 10 October, the Germans 
shifted their artillery efforts to 
repelling 9th Brigade’s assault, which 
gave 7th Brigade some respite. The 
incessant German counterattacks 
on the Braakman front translated 
into constant requests for defensive 
fire, which helped to halt attacks. 
However, batteries around Breskens 
and Flushing relentlessly pummelled 
9th Brigade. The Canadians were very 
busy with CB fire throughout the day, 
firing 33 predicted concentrations, 
some at a ratio of 20 guns per target. 
The several attempts throughout 
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the day at silencing hostile battery 
YT near Breskens were unsuccessful 
because the medium guns southwest 
of Terneuzen were firing at near their 
maximum range.57 As 7th Brigade 
continued to fight forward from 
the Leopold Canal, Major-General 
Spry decided to reinforce success by 
reassigning 8th Brigade, which was 
originally supposed to assist with the 
Leopold attack, to bolster 9th Brigade. 
The bulk of the Canadian artillery 
assets involved in Switchback were 
also transferred to the northeast.58 
German artillery on the Leopold 
front remained “virtually silent” on 
the 11th, while the German coastal 
batteries continued to shell the 
Braakman front.59
The fighting on 9th Brigade’s 
front became increasingly vicious. 
Brigadier Rockingham remarked on 
12 October that the German artillery 
was very effective, against which 
the Canadians had little protection 
in the flat polder country.60 By this 
time, it was clear to the Canadians 
that the fighting in the Breskens 
Pocket was as intense as that during 
the early days of the Normandy 
C a m p a i g n .  G e r m a n  a c t i v i t y , 
especially shelling and mortaring, 
was reduced along the Leopold, as 
only about 100 enemy shells were 
reported to land in that bridgehead 
on the 12th, much less than during 
the first days of the battle. But the 
Braakman bridgehead experienced 
no less than 12 counterattacks 
from 11 to 12 October as well as 
intense artillery bombardment from 
positions near Breskens, Cadzand, 
Flushing and South Beveland.61 
The 12th was a day of very intense 
counter-bombardment, with 52 CB 
shoots. The 3rd Medium Regiment 
fired an impressive 20 CB and 22 
harassing fire tasks, at 99 rounds 
per gun. On the same day the RAF 
conducted a major bombing mission, 
with the heavy bombers attacking 
Breskens and medium bombers 
attacking Cadzand.62 Given the 
increased German attention to the 
Braakman bridgehead, 9th Brigade 
had succeeded in taking pressure 
from 7th Brigade.
The first week of Operation 
Switchback had seen important 
setbacks and unpleasant surprises. 
Progress on the Leopold bridgehead 
was slower than planners had 
anticipated, but 9th Brigade’s 
landing, even though a day late, was 
a great success.
During the second week, shelling 
from both sides steadily declined 
because of limited visibility in the 
autumn weather. Consequently, CB 
work and counter-bombardment 
were less intensive than before. 
Some progress was finally made 
on the Leopold front, as engineers 
finished constructing bridges at 
Strooibrug for tanks.63 Intelligence at 
last acknowledged that the Germans 
had many more troops in the Breskens 
Pocket than it had first estimated. The 
Canadians had only been in contact 
with the forward troops of Eberding’s 
64th Infantry Division in that sector of 
the front before the operation, which 
obscured the division’s reserves. 
Intelligence confirmed from 12 to 13 
October that the entire 3rd Battalion, 
1st Parachute Replacement and 
Training Regiment and Battlegroup 
Krause were in the pocket.64 Overall, 
the 13th was a bad day for CB work. 
The skies were clear enough for 
fighter-bombers to attack German 
guns and two houses that were 
believed to be ammunition dumps 
in front of the Queen’s Own Rifles of 
Canada.65 But the cool temperature 
and wind made it difficult to identify 
active hostile batteries with sound 
ranging. The infantry called only for 
moderate artillery support, a total of 
14 predicted shoots for the day.66
By 14 October, the Canadians 
fighting north of the Leopold against 
the ferocious German defence had 
managed to secure a foothold in the 
southern edge of Eede, a kilometre 
from where they had crossed. The 
bridgehead was large enough for 
3rd Division to move its remaining 
field artillery on that front to new 
gun areas on the opposite side of 
the canal.67 The two bridgeheads 
became linked, and the entire eastern 
portion of the pocket was in Canadian 
hands.68 After severe losses, most 
German units were down to a third of 
their original strength; they had also 
started to withdraw forces from 4th 
Division’s front to the east. As far as 
artillery was concerned, intelligence 
estimated that the Germans still had 
50 field, 30 medium, seven heavy and 
30 heavy anti-aircraft guns, as well as 
35 other unidentified artillery pieces 
for a total of 152 guns of all types 
in the Breskens Pocket. This was 
the largest number of German guns 
holding the approaches to Antwerp, 
but there were formidable artillery 
forces in the adjacent areas as well, 
76 artillery pieces on Walcheren and 
55 in South Beveland.69
The strong, concrete-protected 
coastal artillery positions at Breskens 
and the Flushing batteries were 
notorious for shelling the Canadians, 
especially on 9th Brigade’s line of 
advance along the south shore of 
the West Scheldt. The AOP aircraft 
patrolled the area regularly, which 
made the German firing stop for a 
short time, but did nothing to damage 
the guns or inflict casualties on the 
crews.70 Photographs of Breskens and 
Flushing, which had been heavily 
bombed by the RAF over the previous 
days, suggested that at least half of 
the batteries were destroyed. Three 
positions at Flushing had also been 
demolished. CB work suggested 
that the Germans had redeployed 
their guns, as most of the firing 
over the previous two days had 
come from positions that had not 
previously been located whereas 
known positions had been silent for 
some time.71 The Canadians’ newly 
consolidated major bridgehead and 
the Germans’ reallocation of their 
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guns meant that the battle was 
entering a new phase.
A Brief Respite
The period from 15 to 20 October, following an initial period of 
intense bombardment from both 
sides, was relatively quiet for the 
artillery. German shelling was so 
light and visibility was so poor on 
the 15th that Ross’ staff received 
very little information from 2nd 
Survey Regiment on active hostile 
batteries. Even the coastal batteries 
fired infrequently on 16 October, and 
the Canadians therefore conducted 
very few counter-bombardments.72 
An intelligence summary from 
II Canadian Corps noted on 7th 
Brigade’s frontage that while German 
muzzle flashes were visible on 16 
October, sometimes no shells landed 
in Canadian lines. Brigadier N.E. 
Rodger (Chief of Staff, II Canadian 
Corps) believed this to be an attempt 
to confuse the Canadian flash 
spotters.73 That the Germans made 
the effort to mount such a deceptive 
tactic suggests that Canadian CB 
work had made a difference.
On the morning of the 17th, 
a l though the German coastal 
batteries continued to fire, artillery 
and mortar fire inside the Breskens 
P o c k e t  “ s l a c k e n e d  o f f . ”  T h e 
Canadians conducted only ten CB 
shoots throughout the day, most of 
which were coordinated by the AOP 
squadrons.74 On 18 October, while 
the guns at Flushing continued to 
harass 9th Brigade, German shelling 
was at its lowest level since the 
commencement of Switchback. More 
important, 2nd Survey Regiment’s 
“A” Troop was finally able to 
establish a flash spotting base to 
observe Flushing and pinpoint the 
locations of the German batteries 
there.75
Meanwhile, the infantry had 
made such impressive gains pushing 
the Germans westward that 9th 
AGRA could move its guns across 
the Leopold.76 On the 19th, the 
bad weather made AOP shoots 
impossible, and predicted shoots 
engaged only four hostile batteries.77 
At midnight on 19/20 October, 
the Germans withdrew to the line 
Breskens–Schoondijke–Oostburg–
Sluis, a semicircle that curved to the 
North Sea. Behind it were all the guns 
they could move.78
On 20 October, Spry contrived 
a plan to break the new German 
line. He ordered the 7th Brigade, 
which had just been relieved by the 
British 157th Infantry Brigade, to pass 
through 9th Brigade and clear the 
enemy northeast of Cadzand. At the 
same time, 8th Brigade was to take 
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Oostburg, Sluis and Cadzand, then 
clear what remained of the pocket 
between the Leopold and the coast.79 
The coastal batteries only lightly 
shelled the Canadians. Intelligence 
from a reliable source reported that 
the Germans manned their guns at 
0500 hours daily. To take advantage 
of this opportunity to eliminate some 
crews while they were still in the open, 
a counter-bombardment programme 
fired against five hostile batteries, in 
addition to three predicted shoots.80
Endgame 
21 October–3 November
In the last period of the battle, be tween  21  October  and  3 
November, artillery activity in the 
Breskens Pocket escalated as the 
infantry captured more and more 
ground, but the late October weather 
soon began to impede CB work 
and air support. After the lengthy 
period of minimal German artillery 
activity, operations became more 
intense on 21 October as the German 
situation in the Breskens Pocket 
became desperate. On that day, 
9th Brigade launched attacks on 
Breskens and Schoondijke.81 The 
attack toward Breskens was met 
with heavy shelling, primarily from 
Flushing. But coordinating CB fire 
was difficult because the movement 
of so many Allied guns to new 
positions closer to the front presented 
communications problems. Enemy 
artillery, especially from the Flushing 
batteries, was heavy. However, 
Allied air support was also very 
active. Heavy and medium bombers 
retaliated against Flushing and 
Cadzand, respectively, and hostile 
battery ZQ in Breskens was attacked 
from the air five times. Despite its 
volume, the aerial bombardment 
had mixed results, as batteries in 
those cities were still identified 
as active afterward.82 There was 
only light shelling overnight until 
Batteries Flushing North, Flushing 
West, Flushing East and Dishoek on 
Walcheren opened fire on Canadian 
forces south of Breskens the next 
morning and again in the afternoon. 
Shells landed in the lines of 8th and 
9th Brigades. The Germans also still 
had active artillery in Cadzand, 
which was difficult to locate with any 
certainty because of poor visibility 
in the miserable weather and the 
Lieutenant-Colonel D.G. Crofton of the Canadian Scottish Regiment examines the wreckage of a German 
155 mm gun near Breskens, 28 October 1944. German beach defences are visible in the background.
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dearth of observation points in 
the unrelievedly flat country. The 
weather made AOP useless for several 
days, so counter-bombardment was 
limited to predicted fire from 22 to 
25 October.83
Bad visibility continued into 
the 26th, though there was much 
more shelling than in previous days, 
especially at Schoondijke. On the 
left, after slow progress, 8th Brigade 
captured Oostburg.84 The men of 
Battery Nieuwe Sluis evacuated 
their gun positions and thereafter 
fought as infantry.85 Counter-
bombardment was again limited to 
18 predicted shoots.86 The weather 
slightly improved the next day, 27 
October, which allowed for sound 
ranging to identify five new unfixed 
batteries. However, 202nd Naval 
Coast Artillery Battalion’s batteries 
at Domburg, Zouteland and Dishoek 
on Walcheren were too distant to be 
located accurately.87
The German shelling on the 28th 
was the heaviest it had been for a long 
time. The Canadians concluded that 
the Germans had been conserving 
their ammunition until they realized 
that there was nothing to be gained 
by hoarding it any longer.88 The 
last German artillery unit left in the 
pocket, 203rd Naval Coast Artillery 
Battalion, fought on at Cadzand with 
two 150 mm howitzers and a troop of 
gunners converted to infantry.89 The 
next day, its commander reported 
dwindling supplies of 150 mm rounds 
and that his unit was down to nine 
officers and 243 other ranks. Though 
the situation was hopeless, the 
battalion was promised a shipment 
of ammunition that night and was 
told that “the bridgehead was to 
be defended to the last cartridge.”90 
As far as Ross was concerned, CB 
work for Operation Switchback was 
practically complete since most of 
the known German batteries in the 
Breskens Pocket had been overrun. 
Ross’ attention shifted to softening 
German positions on Walcheren in 
preparation for the impending attack. 
Ten of the remaining batteries were 
attacked by heavy bombers and 
fighter-bombers, but with limited 
success as some of them survived 
and were still active later in the day.91
At 1800 hours on 31 October, 
the Germans’ 203rd Naval Coast 
Artillery Battalion reported that its 
strength was down to six officers and 
86 other ranks. It had no operational 
guns left.92 The job was almost over 
and 3rd Division no longer needed 
the immense artillery support it had 
been allotted at the beginning of 
the operation. The attention of First 
Canadian Army, and indeed much 
of 21st Army Group, was on the new 
task at hand: the capture of Walcheren 
Island (Operation Infatuate). The 
week before, 9th AGRA had been 
moved to support 52nd (Lowland) 
and 2nd Canadian Infantry Divisions 
on South Beveland.93 On 31 October, 
2nd Canadian AGRA and 61st and 
110th Field Regiments, RA were 
reallocated to coastal positions 
to support Infatuate, leaving 3rd 
Division with only its own field 
artillery.94 From 1 November, while 
the Canadian artillery moved into its 
new positions to support the assault 
on Walcheren, the infantry mopped 
up the remainder of the pocket. 
Knokke, Heist-aan-Zee and Sluis 
were all cleared. On 3 November, with 
no German strongpoints remaining 
in the Breskens Pocket, Operation 
Switchback was complete.95
The clearing of the Breskens 
Pocket had been a dreadful experience 
for all of the forces involved. The duel 
between Allied and German artillery 
had been intense. While the German 
guns were set on obliterating the 
attacking Canadian infantry, the 
Canadian guns aimed to suppress 
and silence its opposite numbers. In 
the end, it was a decisive victory for 
the Allies and a source of pride for the 
Canadians. CB work was an integral 
part of that victory, but the efforts 
of Lieutenant-Colonel Ross and 2nd 
Survey Regiment were at the mercy of 
the unfavourable weather. After the 
first week of Switchback, identifying 
and accurately locating hostile 
batteries was difficult. Clouds and 
rain hindered air support and wind 
interfered with sound. Fortunately, 
the periods during which CB work 
was least productive were also those 
in which the German artillery was 
least active. In other words, CB work 
was effective when it was needed 
the most.
Aftermath and Analysis
The clearing of the Breskens Pocket provided important lessons 
regarding CB fire. The large volume 
of shells devoted to CB tasks made 
it seem that counter-bombardment 
during Operation Switchback was 
overwhelmingly effective. However, 
operational research revealed that 
hostile batteries were only being 
temporarily silenced. The experience 
of clearing the Breskens Pocket made 
it clear that while the Canadians may 
have been adept at locating hostile 
batteries, counter-bombardment 
through predicted shooting was 
much less accurate than expected.
How effective had CB methods 
been? A study conducted by 3rd 
Division after the battle stated 
that “difficulties of operation of 
Flash Spotting and Sound Ranging 
in  polder  country”  made CB 
information “unreliable,” though 
the final report did not elaborate.96 
Certainly, the terrain of the pocket 
and the worsening autumn weather 
had presented challenges to CB work, 
especially during the final phase. But 
Ross had extolled the effectiveness 
of sound ranging throughout the 
operation. Sound ranging undeniably 
had advantages over flash spotting 
and aerial photography because it 
was less affected by poor visibility 
caused by the weather.
However,  2nd CBO Staff’s 
intelligence summaries are slightly 
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A prepared, but unoccupied, German gun position 
outside the village of Retranchement was identified 
on Canadian defence overprint maps as early as 10 
September 1944. The position was considered active 
on the eve of Operation Switchback and targeted by the 
predicted fire of 10 troops of 5.5-inch and 7.2-inch guns 
which fired 112 rounds at the target. An operational 
research report later determined that only 11 shells 
fell near the German battery. Aerial reconnaissance 
photos taken on 21 October show the position (above 
and closeup right). The large craters which straddle the 
position were left by an attack by medium bombers. The 
smaller craters left by the artillery are more difficult to 
discern on the air photo.
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Left: This figure shows a plot of the artillery shells 
directed at the German battery. It was found that the 
mean point of impact (MPI) was 102 yards past and 78 
yards to the right of the target.  Only 11 shells of 112 
fired fell with a 100 yard box centred on the target.
Report No.24, “Accuracy of Predicted Shooting,” in Terry Copp, 
ed., Montgomery’s Scientists: Operational Research in Northwest 
Europe, 1944–1945 (Waterloo, ON: LCMSDS, 2000), pp.311-23.
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misleading with respect to the value 
of sound ranging. A careful statistical 
analysis of the hostile battery lists and 
CB intelligence summaries indicates 
that although sound ranging was the 
most frequently successful method of 
identifying active German batteries, 
by itself it rarely provided enough 
information to fix a battery. Of 
197 fixed batteries listed in the 
counter-battery documents from 5 
October to 4 November, 74.6 percent 
appeared as “fixed” for the first time 
as a result of aerial photography, not 
sound ranging. A further 2.5 percent 
were fixed by AOP. Sound ranging 
accounted for only 5.1 percent of 
batteries listed as “fixed” for the 
first time.97 In other words, while 
sound ranging could identify and 
roughly locate a hostile battery, 
aerial photography was required in 
order to gain enough information 
about it before it could be engaged. 
Conversely, aerial photography 
could only be used when the weather 
permitted. Therefore, in the Breskens 
Pocket, no single counter-battery 
technique could pinpoint hostile 
batteries by itself.
How accurate was the Canadian 
CB fire during the battle? One method 
was through operational research 
which had already revealed some 
very important lessons about artillery 
by the time of Switchback. There 
were already some serious doubts 
in 1944 as to the accuracy of artillery 
fire. The 3rd Medium Regiment, RCA 
participated in a simulation in April 
1944 to test methods of measuring 
the accuracy of artillery fire and 
determine the causes of inaccuracies. 
The experiment involved firing on 
three dummy targets, codenamed 
Mars, Jupiter and Saturn, and 
measuring the discrepancies between 
each shell crater and the targets. The 
study produced some interesting 
results. The mean point of impact 
of the 48 rounds fired at Jupiter was 
one degree 33 minutes to the right 
and 27 yards long of the target. 
Similarly, the mean point of impact 
for the bombardment on Saturn 
was 36 minutes to the right and 
228 yards short of the target. Only 
one dummy gun at Saturn was hit 
in the entire experiment, and that 
hit was by a single shell fragment. 
In other words, on average, shells 
not only missed Jupiter and Saturn, 
they did so by a wide margin in both 
bearing and range. Worst of all, an 
error at the command post meant 
that a quarter of the rounds directed 
at Mars landed over 1,000 yards 
past the target. Unfortunately, the 
report was not completed until after 
the Battle of the Scheldt. The study 
yielded no general conclusions as it 
was meant to be supplemented by 
future experiments.98 Nevertheless, it 
showed that the slightest errors could 
produce wildly inaccurate results in 
a bombardment.
By autumn 1944, concentrations 
were getting larger and units were 
using ammunition from different 
production lots as well as uncalibrated 
guns, and it was suspected that 
predicted shooting was inaccurate. 
The question of accuracy was crucial. 
No.2 Operational Research Section 
(ORS) could do little work in autumn 
of 1944, in part because the fighting 
was a continuous struggle with few 
large set-piece battles. However, 
Major J.G. Wallace, one of the artillery 
experts in No.2 ORS, did manage to 
conduct an important examination of 
the accuracy of predicted fire in which 
he focused on CB fire. There were few 
suitable battlefields on which to base 
the study. The Breskens Pocket was 
the logical choice because “little if any 
firing had taken place beforehand, 
and where the distribution of shells 
could be examined soon after firing, 
without any danger of its being 
confused by subsequent fighting.”99
The inherent problem with 
c o u n t e r - b o m b a r d m e n t  w a s 
ascertaining its effectiveness while 
a battle was still in progress. If an 
enemy battery ceased to fire, was 
it because friendly artillery had 
successfully destroyed it, or had 
the enemy simply moved its guns 
to another location? Or had the 
battery run out of shells? Visual 
confirmation that a hostile battery 
had been destroyed was often needed 
to consider it permanently silenced. 
Thus, operational research conducted 
after a battle was the only way to 
assess the effectiveness of counter-
bombardment.
Wallace’s examination of the 
accuracy of CB fire in the Breskens 
Pocket  was  nothing short  o f 
groundbreaking. No.2 ORS examined 
aerial photographs of five hostile 
batteries engaged on 6 October. 
Hostile battery history sheets 
confirmed that the pre-zero counter-
bombardment programme was the 
first time each of these batteries 
had been fired upon. They had 
not been engaged again between 
H-Hour and the time at which the 
photographs were taken or affected 
by the engagement of any other 
battery.100 The study found that shells 
had fallen over a large area, typically 
1,000 yards square. Only about 4.4 
percent of shells landed within 100 
yards square of the target, meaning it 
would take over 2,000 shots to cause 
100 of them to fall into an area of 
100 yards square. Wallace attributed 
this dispersion to errors in sight 
testing and command post work. 
Meteorological work, survey and 
calibration only accounted for minor 
errors in the fall of shot.101
A report compiled after the war, 
using data from Operations Wellhit 
(Boulogne), Switchback and Veritable 
(Rhineland), confirmed Wallace’s 
conclusions. Only 5 percent of shells 
could be expected to land within 
100 yards square of a hostile battery. 
Though CB fire could still have a 
neutralizing effect on the enemy, 
even a heavy bombardment could 
produce only temporary results.102 
Operational research seriously 
challenged the Allies’ perception 
of the accuracy of artillery, not just 
during Switchback, but predicted fire 
in general. Either more shells would 
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be required or measures would have 
to be taken to improve the accuracy of 
each shell in future operations. 
In the end, the inaccuracy 
of  art i l lery  compromised the 
effectiveness of counter-bombardment 
during Operation Switchback. 
Artillery fire undoubtedly hurt the 
Germans’ morale and impeded 
their movements, but certainly the 
experience in the Breskens Pocket 
showed that it was too inaccurate 
to destroy a hostile battery or 
neutralize it for very long. Despite 
the disappointing performance of 
artillery in terms of accuracy during 
the battle, operational research 
helped commanders understand 
why errors were so prevalent and 
gave clues as to how they could be 
remedied. Operational research alone 
could not achieve victory: it was up 
to gifted field commanders to use its 
lessons to the Allies’ advantage to 
bring a speedy and welcome end to 
the Second World War.
Conclusion
Prior to Operation Switchback, t h e  C a n a d i a n s  h a d  l i t t l e 
intelligence concerning German 
strength, dispositions or locations of 
hostile batteries beyond the forward 
defences. This was a serious handicap 
for counter-battery efforts. Because 
the German batteries were relatively 
silent before the battle, the Canadians 
had only fixed a small number. Once 
the battle was underway, the CB 
organization had to contend with 
poor visibility from the worsening 
autumn weather, a lengthy period 
of German inactivity and the lack of 
natural observation posts on the flat 
terrain.
The battle exemplified the 
weaknesses of specific counter-
battery techniques. Careful analysis 
shows that sound ranging was not 
precise enough to accurately locate 
German guns. Regardless of how well 
sound ranging worked in identifying 
an active German battery, aerial 
photography was almost always 
needed to engage it. Unfortunately, 
photo-reconnaissance aircraft could 
only operate in good weather and 
sound ranging was most effective 
in clear, calm weather. Yet in the all 
too rare occurrences of favourable 
condi t ions ,  the  two methods 
produced invaluable information on 
the location, size and behaviour of 
German batteries. That the Canadians 
had known so little about the German 
reserves and coastal positions before 
the battle made the success of CB 
work an even greater achievement. 
In the end, the Allied counter-battery 
methods proved to be invaluable 
during Switchback.
As Major Wallace discovered in 
his study of the battlefield, counter-
bombardment by predicted shooting 
suffered from severe limitations. 
The primary culprits for the wide 
dispersion of shells were errors at the 
command post and in sight testing, 
not calibration or meteorology. 
Survey mistakes were responsible 
only for marginal errors. Given the 
limitations of CB work during quiet 
periods and in poor weather, as 
well as the inaccuracy of predicted 
shooting, artillery accounted for a 
less substantial role in the Canadian 
victory at the Scheldt than historians 
have previously realized.
The Canadian struggle for 
the Breskens Pocket was not an 
exercise in “brute force.” Despite 
the large number of artillery units 
devoted to Switchback, planners 
had never meant to use artillery 
as a “blunt instrument.” Instead, 
artillery was employed as flexibly 
as possible for attacks on precise 
targets. The diligence of Lieutenant-
Colonel J.H.D. Ross and 2nd Survey 
Regiment, RCA shows that the Allies 
used highly developed methods to 
enable the artillery to silence German 
guns with the most intelligent and 
economical application of firepower. 
Such methods do not resemble the 
clumsy tactics presented in John Ellis’ 
“brute force” thesis.
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